UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 5

Article 11

8-2021

Who Now Sits atop the Pyramid of Violence?
Harrison Weimer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Harrison Weimer, Who Now Sits atop the Pyramid of Violence?, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1469 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol11/iss5/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.

Clean Final Edit_Weimer.docx (Do Not Delete)

8/19/21 3:09 PM

Who Now Sits atop the Pyramid of
Violence?
Harrison Weimer*
This Note seeks to provoke a conversation about the rise in power of federal prosecutors
at the expense of district court judges, focusing on the controlled-substances context. While
referencing Robert Cover’s portrayal of the justice system as a “pyramid of violence,” this Note
shows how the federal mandatory-minimum sentencing laws and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines brought about this change. These sentencing schemes
have anchored what prosecutors and judges deem an appropriate sentence. Prosecutors are
thinking about sentences while deciding what charges to bring. After a discussion about
sentencing legislation and current sentencing procedures, this Note identifies a need for reform
in the federal criminal justice system. The elimination of mandatory sentencing laws, the
normalization of departure from the Guidelines, and the creation of the executive prosecutor
role are reforms identified in this Note.

* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Professor Gregory
Shaffer for his guidance and his Jurisprudence course that prompted this Note. Many thanks to
professors, family, and friends for suggested revisions and to the UC Irvine Law Review editors for their
stellar work throughout the editorial process.
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We begin, then, not with what the judges say, but with what they do. The
judges deal pain and death. That is not all that they do. Perhaps that is not what
they usually do. But they do deal death, and pain. From John Winthrop through
Warren Burger they have sat atop a pyramid of violence . . . .1
- Robert Cover
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 2 and the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 19863 forever changed the landscape of the punishments
delivered by federal courts to criminal defendants.4 Prior to 1987,5 district court
judges enjoyed wide discretion in choosing how to sentence criminals and, per legal
scholar Professor Robert Cover, “they have sat atop a pyramid of violence.”6 With
the implementation of the Guidelines by the U.S. Sentencing Commission
(Commission) and mandatory minimums passed by Congress for
controlled-substance offenses, the Commission and federal prosecutors have now

1. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
2. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sent’g tbl. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)).
4. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks of the Honorable Edwin Meese III
Attorney General of the United States on the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Before the
American Law Institute 11 (May 22, 1987), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/
2011/08/23/05-22-1987.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3Z2-A4U3] (“These guidelines mark a decisive
turning point in the history of the federal criminal justice system. They point us towards the sound,
predictable, tough yet rational sentencing structure that the federal system long has needed.”).
5. Magdeline Jensen, This Issue in Brief, 55 FED. PROB. 1, 1 (1991) (“Y[ears from] now,
1987—the year sentencing guidelines went into effect—will be remembered as a milestone in Federal
criminal justice.”).
6. Cover, supra note 1.
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challenged district court judges for the top spot on this pyramid.7 More so than
judges, these major players in the federal criminal justice system limit judicial
discretion in sentencing and now play a bigger role in determining the price
defendants pay. Professor Cover, although writing before the mandatory-minimum
era, failed to acknowledge the limiting role of district court judges because of the
minimal number of trials held in federal court.8
This Note seeks to show how the Commission and federal prosecutors dictate
the punishment outcomes for defendants in controlled-substances cases more so
than district court judges. While the Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s mandatory minimums
are binding, and while the Guidelines anchor judges’ decisions during sentencing,9
federal prosecutors use these quantitative limits on judicial discretion as a tool to
push plea bargains to advance their position to the top of the pyramid of violence.
To restore fairness and individualism to the criminal justice system, mandatory
sentencing provisions must be put to rest, departure from the Guidelines should be
normalized, and executive prosecutors should be explored as a possibility in
prosecutorial offices.
I. CONSTRUCTING THE PYRAMID
A. Violence and the Word
Professor Cover, a liberalist, was a legal scholar and professor at Yale Law
School until 1986.10 Professor Cover wrote, as the introductory sentence of his most
famous article Violence and the Word, “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of
pain and death.” 11 Professor Cover meant that when a judge formulates an
interpretation of the text of the law, somebody else loses liberties such as freedom,

7. A federal criminal defendant is sentenced under both sentencing schemes if there are
mandatory-minimum laws that apply to the case. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16–17 ( 2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/
20170711_Mand-Min.pdf [ https://perma.cc/H4SS-JSP7 ] [ hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN
OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES ].
8. John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who Do Are
Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. ( June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/
06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty [ https://
perma.cc/W76U-Y4MX ].
9. Although Congress enacted a “mandatory” guidelines system in the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, in 2005 the Supreme Court held that a mandatory sentencing system was unconstitutional.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). The guidelines were then deemed “advisory.”
Id. at 246–47. However, the advisory Guidelines continue to anchor federal sentencing determinations.
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 549–50 (2013).
10. Guido Calabresi, Michael J. Graetz, Barbara A. Black, Stephen Wizner, David Brion Davis,
Tanina Rostain, Owen M. Fiss & James Ponet, Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1699,
1699 (1987).
11. Cover, supra note 1, at 1601.
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children, or property. 12 This legal interpretation is constrained by the need to
anesthetize the judge against feeling responsible for the violence and by the need to
convince other officials to carry out the sentence.13 Therefore, the judge “s[its] atop
[this] pyramid of violence.”14
Although sentencing is routine to a judge’s duties, judges are removed from
the practical implications of their sentences and are not forced to carry out the very
“violence” they authorize. Professor Cover notes that “[t]he violence of the act of
sentencing is most obvious when observed from the defendant’s perspective.”15
While Professor Cover’s work is a seminal piece that first emphasized the role of
violence in legal interpretation, Professor Cover’s work now incorrectly identifies
the judge as the leading role in this setting because the role of the prosecutor has
risen to the top. To be fair to Professor Cover, the U.S. criminal justice system has
shifted since Violence and the Word. Mandatory minimums and the Guidelines of
today were not part of the legal landscape considered by Professor Cover.
B. Implementation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ultimately resulted in the
creation of the Guidelines.16 The Act’s objective was to improve the ability of the
criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective yet fair sentencing
procedure.17 With honesty, clarity, and proportionality in mind, Congress sought
practical uniformity in sentencing by lessening the wide inequalities in sentences
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. 18 The
Guidelines were a response to critics who thought “[b]oth by substantive controls
and through procedural revisions the unchecked powers of the untutored judge
should be subject to a measure of regulation. The vague, indefinite, and uncritical
use of indeterminate sentences calls for restriction through meaningful definitions
and discriminating judgments.”19 The Guidelines manual, first released in 1987, has
generally been updated annually.20 The most recent manual is the 2018 version.21

12. Id. This loss of liberty can be in the form of incarceration, monetary damages, custodial
rights and privileges, or other means. When a judge decides how to interpret or apply the written text
of a law, the decision often has negative real-world effects on at least one of the parties.
13. Id. at 1626–27.
14. Id. at 1609.
15. Id. at 1608.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3551.
17. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 69 (1983) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 3551 “should permit enough
flexibility to individualize sentences according to the characteristics of the offense and the offender,
while at the same time resulting in the imposition of sentences that treat offenders consistently
and fairly”).
18. Id.
19. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 41 (1972).
20. See Guidelines Archive, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/archive
[ https://perma.cc/FES6-HFTQ ] (last visited July 20, 2021).
21. Id.
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SENTENCING TABLE

(in months of imprisonment)
Offense
Level
1
2
3
4
Zone A
5
6
7
8
9
Zone B
10
11
12
Zone C
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Zone D
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

I

Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
II

III

IV

V

VI

(0 or 1)

(2 or 3)

(4, 5, 6)

(7, 8, 9)

(10, 11, 12)

(13 or more)

0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
78–97
87–108
97–121
108–135
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
1–7
2–8
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
78–97
87–108
97–121
108–135
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
1–7
2–8
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
78–97
87–108
97–121
108–135
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
0–6
2–8
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
77–96
84–105
92–115
100–125
110–137
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
2–8
4–10
6–12
9–15
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
77–96
84–105
92–115
100–125
110–137
120–150
130–162
140–175
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
1–7
3–9
6–12
9–15
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
77–96
84–105
92–115
100–125
110–137
120–150
130–162
140–175
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

November 1, 2016

Figure 1: Sentencing Table.22
In controlled-substances cases, the offense level, which directs the sentence
for each defendant, is primarily driven by the quantity of the controlled substance.23
Offense levels, seen in figure 1, range from one to forty-three, and enhancements
for playing a leadership role, possessing a firearm, or obstructing justice can drive
up this number but play a very minor role compared to the quantity of the

22.
23.

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sent’g tbl. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id. § 2D1.1(c).
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substance.24 For example, possession of 450 kilograms or more of cocaine yields a
base offense level of thirty-eight25 while 2 kilograms to 3.5 kilograms of cocaine
yields a base offense level of twenty-six,26 but firearms or obstruction-of-justice
enhancements only warrant an additional two points.27 The enhancements, found
in Chapter Three of the Guidelines, are applied after the base offense level is
identified.28 Adjustments can shift the offense level up or down depending on their
nature.29 To put the above offense levels in the context of the length of sentence to
be imposed, a convicted defendant with an offense level of thirty-eight warrants a
sentence of 235 to 293 months while an offense level of twenty-six warrants a
sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.30 An enhancement for abuse of
position of trust or use of special skill, for example, adds two points to the base
offense level.31 In the scenario above, the offense levels would be adjusted to forty
and twenty-eight, yielding sentences of 292 to 365 months and seventy-eight to
ninety-seven months, assuming the defendant has no criminal history.32
The Guidelines indicate the Commission’s preference for punishing primarily
based on the quantity rather than on the role in the operation. Enhancements serve
as adjustments rather than as a weighted starting point. Initially, the Guidelines
often provided harsher sentences than those indicated by the mandatory minimums
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.33 Since the implementation of the Guidelines
and the decreased intensity of the U.S. War on Drugs, the corresponding offense
level for each quantity of drug has become more forgiving for defendants. For
example, the “Crack Minus Two Amendment” of 2007 reduced by two points the
base offense levels assigned by the Drug Quantity Table for each quantity of crack
cocaine.34 The Commission expanded this reduction through the “Drugs Minus
24. See id. ch. 3. Criminal history plays a larger role than leadership or firearm enhancements
but less of a role than the quantity of a controlled substance. See id. ch. 4 (identifying how criminal
history and criminal livelihood are calculated and affect the sentencing); supra Figure 1.
25. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
26. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(7).
27. Id. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), 3C1.1.
28. See id. ch. 3.
29. See id.
30. Both advisory sentence ranges assume no criminal history. See supra Figure 1. “A defendant
with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of
greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to
society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence.”
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
31. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
32. See supra Figure 1.
33. See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, CJPF.ORG, https://www.cjpf.org/
mandatory-minimums [ https://perma.cc/4ENC-NDF7 ] (last visited July 20, 2021) (“For over two
decades beginning in 1987, the sentencing guidelines had a near-mandatory quality, and provided for
sentences for drug quantities greater than the minimum trigger quantities in the drug statute (21
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)), and provided for sentences longer than the mandatory minimum sentence for
that drug.”).
34. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amends. 706, 711 & 713 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018).
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Two Amendment,” which then reduced by two points the base offense levels
assigned by the Drug Quantity Table for all drugs in 2014.35
C. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 substantially revised the federal drug laws,
introducing mandatory-minimum sentences. 36 Mandatory-minimum sentencing
laws force a district court judge to hand down a prison sentence based on the
charges a prosecutor brings against a defendant. The prosecutor, in part, bases the
charges he or she brings on the quantity and type of drugs. Judges can still sentence
more than the mandatory minimum but cannot go below. These laws strip a judge’s
traditional authority to account for the nuances and actual circumstances—whether
mitigating or aggravating—of the crimes alleged and the characteristics of the
individual defendant when imposing the sentence. For example, the 1986 Act
required a minimum sentence of five years for drug offenses that involved 5 grams
of crack, 500 grams of cocaine, 1 kilogram of heroin, 40 grams of a substance with
a detectable amount of fentanyl, 5 grams of methamphetamine, 100 kilograms or
100 plants of marijuana, among other drugs.37 These wide-ranging quantities for
different drugs indicate the differing internal priorities of the War on Drugs. To put
it into context, “[f]or methamphetamine, offenders face a minimum five-year
sentence for distribution of five grams, the weight of five Sweet-n-Low packets,
when a heavy user might go through a gram in a day.”38 As the quantity of drugs
increase, the mandatory-minimum sentence increases accordingly. On the most
severe end of the spectrum, “[i]f any person commits [another] violation after a
prior conviction for a serious drug felony . . . and if death or serious bodily injury
results from the use of such substance[, the defendant] shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment.”39 Mandatory minimums apply in a little less than half of the federal
controlled-substance cases in the United States.40
Unlike the corresponding system of the Guidelines, which now provides an
advisory sentence range after the computation of circumstances by the judge,

35. See KIM STEVEN HUNT, DAVID RUTTER & TODD KOSTYSHAK, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
RETROACTIVITY & RECIDIVISM: THE DRUGS MINUS TWO AMENDMENT 1 (2020).
36. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33.
38. Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Mandatory minimums were also put in place for recidivism. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (requiring life sentence if a defendant has two or more prior drug felonies). This
was changed with the implementation of the First Step Act in 2018. See First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2)(A)(ii), 132 Stat. 5220, 5220 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841).
40. In the fiscal year 2016, mandatory minimums were used less often in federal drug offenses
(44.7% in fiscal year 2016 versus 66.1% in fiscal year 2010) but continued to result in long sentences
for drug offenders. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR DRUG OFFENSES
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4–5 (2017) [ hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES ].
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mandatory-minimum laws allow no room for judicial discretion. 41 The average
sentence for drug offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum
is ninety-four months of imprisonment, more than double the average sentence for
offenders whose drug offense does not carry a mandatory minimum.42 In practice,
“Congress abandoned the idea that [f]ederal judges—appointed by the President
and confirmed by the U.S. Senate—have the wisdom and training to identify the
most serious drug offenders and punish them appropriately.”43
Although Congress passed the mandatory-minimum laws with an aim towards
prosecuting major drug traffickers, this has not been the case. Almost three-quarters
of federal inmates serving time for drug offenses were sentenced under mandatory
minimums. 44 In 2009, the Commission reported that “high-level” suppliers or
importers comprised only 10.9% of federal defendants.45 Through the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Congress wanted to impose heavy penalties for certain kinds of
serious cases, including those involving drugs, to deter crime and create consistency
in penalties across federal districts.46 However, judges have been unable to exercise
their discretion to combat the negative effect these mandatory minimums have had
on low-level, nonviolent offenders. Many of these low-level offenders have received
draconian sentences that pale in comparison to those of violent offenders.47 For
example, a “mule”—a low-level person who carries a large quantity of illicit drugs,
often inside of his or her body—can be punished either strictly based on the amount
in his or her body or based on the whole operation.48 However, the Guidelines
attempt to “reward” those who play minimal roles in the crime by adjusting their
41. See id.; see also Lori Atherton, Federal Judge, Former U.S. Attorney Discuss Mandatory
Minimum Sentences at Michigan Law, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://
www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/Federal-Judge-Former-U.S.-Attorney-DiscussMandatory-Minimum-Sentences-at-Michigan-Law_112618.aspx [ https://web.archive.org/web/20190
801235727/https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/Federal-Judge-Former-U.S.Attorney-Discuss-Mandatory-Minimum-Sentences-at-Michigan-Law_112618.aspx ].
42. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 36.
43. See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33.
44. Mandatory-minimum penalties continue to have a significant impact on the size and
composition of the federal prison population. Approximately half (49.1%) of all federal inmates are
drug offenders and 72.3% of those offenders are serving a mandatory minimum. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 4.
45. Id. at 45. Wholesalers of any amount made up 21.2%; street-level dealers made up 17.2%,
and couriers made up 23.1% of those sentenced for drug offenses. Id. Only 2.2% were managers or
supervisors. Id. The rest of federal drug defendants were other low-level offenders, even marginally
involved friends and family of the accused. Id.
46. See Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Armed Career
Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200, 201 (2019) (“The members
of Congress who voted for these changes believed they would minimize unwarranted disparities in
sentencing, make criminal sentences more transparent, and improve public safety.”).
47. Atherton, supra note 41.
48. “When the traffickers got to know that I held an American passport, they realized that they
could use me to mule illicit drugs into the United States of America. I was instructed to swallow drugs
and board a plane.” Drug Mules: Swallowed by the Illicit Drug Trade, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS
& CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/southasia/frontpage/2012/october/drug-mules_-swallowed-bythe-illicit-drug-trade.html [ https://perma.cc/M4LG-C9VE ] (last visited July, 20, 2021).
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offense level.49 These discrepancies that exist between the intent behind mandatory
minimums and their effect are not an issue of the past; drug offenses remain the
most commonly charged offenses carrying mandatory-minimum penalties.50
D. Why Judges Are Not on Top
Prior to 1986, the federal sentencing system was almost entirely unregulated.
Judges sentenced with minimal legal constraints, and review by appellate courts
almost never overturned district court sentences.51 However, judges are no longer
at the top of the pyramid of violence because they are now restricted by the
Guidelines and mandatory minimums. With the implementation of the Guidelines
and mandatory minimums, both the Commission and federal prosecutors now play
bigger roles than they did before 1987. Although no longer mandatory, the
Guidelines continue to be the starting point—and most of the time the
endpoint—for district judges when determining sentences. 52 The Guidelines
anchor judges’ and prosecutors’ thinking during punishment. Since the Supreme
Court ruled to make the Guidelines advisory to preserve a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury in United States v. Booker in 2005, there have been
eight Supreme Court cases that directly discussed the Guidelines.53 Collectively,
these eight decisions have “not only significantly affected the sentencing practices
of the district courts but also have reinstated a deferential standard of review in the
appellate courts. Nonetheless, the Commission and the guidelines continue to play
an important role in federal sentencing.”54
However, the mandatory minimums completely remove room for any judicial
discretion and often force judges to sentence in a manner they may view as unjust.
Eastern District of Michigan Judge Avern Cohn said,
“The most sacred quality that judges guard most is discretion, which is
choice . . . . Mandatory minimums take that choice away from a judge.
You’re obligated to follow the statute, and if you don’t follow the statue
[sic], your decision is going to go to the court of appeals and get reversed.
And judges don’t like to have their decisions reversed.”55

49. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
50. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 16.
51. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“We begin with the general
proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute
under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.”).
52. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246–47 (2005).
53. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
40 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90–93 (2007); Irizarry v. United States, 553
U.S. 708, 709–10 (2008); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (per curiam); Nelson
v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351–52 (2009) (per curiam); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819
(2010); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480–81 (2011).
54. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF U NITED S TATES
V . B OOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 10 (2012).
55. Atherton, supra note 41.
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Judges’ discretion is now limited by the Guidelines and mandatory minimums,
yet prosecutors are able to use the Guidelines and mandatory minimums when
charging. Further, prosecutors routinely use the Guidelines as a tool for pushing
plea bargains.56
Professor Cover’s statements now overemphasize the role of the judge when
it comes to convicting and sentencing. Although judges legitimize the “violence”
that stems from the federal criminal justice system, the legal interpretation
articulated by judges, as discussed by Professor Cover, is also limited by the fact that
only two percent of those charged with drug offenses in federal court go to trial.57
Additionally, most of these trials are tried by juries, not the bench.58
While the Guidelines were published after Professor Cover’s Violence and the
Word, he would likely agree that the Guidelines and mandatory minimums further
remove the judge morally and ethically from the “violence” they authorize by
further limiting their legal interpretation and discretion. 59 After leaving the
courtroom, a defendant’s sentence is traditionally carried out by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons or the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services office. Since the publication
of Violence and the Word, federal prosecutors, aided by the Commission and the
Guidelines, have entered the legal landscape with more power to wield violence.
II. RISE TO THE TOP
A. The U.S. Sentencing Commission
The Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch created by
Congress as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.60 The President nominates
the seven voting members of the Commission. 61 These members must then be
confirmed by the Senate. 62 There must be at least three federal judges on the
Commission.63 Furthermore, there cannot be more than four members from the
same political party on the Commission. 64 The Attorney General, or Attorney
General’s designee, and the chair of the U.S. Parole Commission serve as nonvoting

56. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutorspush-for-plea-bargains.html [ https://perma.cc/4P4L-W627 ] (“After decades of new laws to toughen
sentencing for criminals, prosecutors have gained greater leverage to extract guilty pleas from
defendants and reduce the number of cases that go to trial, often by using the threat of more serious
charges with mandatory sentences or other harsher penalties.”).
57. Only 499 of the 21,771 drug cases filed in federal district courts went to trial in 2018.
Gramlich, supra note 8.
58. Id.
59. See Cover, supra note 1, at 1626–27.
60 .
Organization, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/
organization [ https://perma.cc/4Q45-QVWS ] (last visited July 20, 2021); 18 U.S.C. § 3551.
61. Organization, supra note 60.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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members of the Commission. 65 The agency’s mission is to establish sentencing
policies and practices for the federal courts, including guidelines regarding the
appropriate form and severity of punishment for offenders convicted in federal
district court. 66 Further, the Commission advises Congress on crime policy
and research.67
The Commission sits higher on the pyramid of violence than district court
judges. The Commission is the sole determiner of what offense level is warranted
by each quantity of each controlled substance.68 From there, the Commission then
dictates what advisory guideline sentence range is warranted by each offense level.
Therefore, the Commission can control the sentence of controlled-substance
offenders based primarily on the quantity of narcotics a defendant is responsible
for. The Commission formally limits judicial discretion by indicating where the
judge must start sentencing computation.69
Judges have generally disliked the Guidelines since its first release in 1987
because the Guidelines effectually eliminated their discretion and were commonly
perceived as draconian.70 In 2010, the Commission conducted a survey of federal
judges to garner opinions of the makeup and practical impact of the Guidelines.71
Question Eight of the survey asked judges, in their opinion, about the
appropriateness of the Guidelines and whether they thought the sentencing ranges
were too high or too low.72 Of the drug offenses listed in the survey,73 about 57%
thought the sentencing ranges were appropriate, about 4.5% thought the ranges
were too low, and about 38% thought the ranges were too high.74 Although there
is some consensus on the appropriateness of the Guidelines, over forty percent of
the judges surveyed would prefer to sentence outside of the sentencing ranges for
controlled-substance offenses.75
For better or for worse, judges are initially bound by calculating the advisory
sentence under the Guidelines. However, a judge’s decision is final even if it is

65. Id.
66. About, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page [ https://perma.cc/
AE8W-KSE6 ] (last visited July 20, 2021).
67. Id.
68. See Drug Cases, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/drug-cases
[https://perma.cc/8Z6L-GTXM] (last visited July 20, 2021).
69. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”).
70. Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 724 (2005).
71. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, at 1–4 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS
OF SURVEY].
72. Id. at pt. III, tbl.8.
73. Heroin, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, ecstasy, and
oxycodone. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
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outside the Guidelines’ range as long as it is reasonable. 76 At the same time,
sentences that are within the Guidelines’ range are presumed to be reasonable.77
Unlike judges before 1987, judges now must give a justification for departures from
the advisory sentence range.78 The Supreme Court has further advocated that the
greater the variance from the advisory guideline range, the more significant the
justification must be.79
In addition to updating and releasing the annual Guidelines, the Commission
also produces reports about the practical implications of the Guidelines. Through
these reports, the Commission gathers sentencing data and makes formal
recommendations to Congress. These recommendations have suggested
a strong and effective [federal] sentencing guidelines system best serves the
purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. . . . [If] Congress decides to
exercise its power to direct [federal] sentencing policy by enacting
mandatory minimum penalties, . . . such penalties should (1) not be
excessively severe, (2) be narrowly tailored to apply only to those offenders
who warrant such punishment, and (3) be applied consistently. . . .
Congress [should] request prison impact analyses [from the Commission]
as early as possible in its legislative process whenever it considers enacting
or amending [mandatory minimum] penalties . . . .80
In 2011, the Commission explained that it “stands ready to work with
Congress on measures that can be taken to enhance the strength and effectiveness
of the current guidelines system and address the problems with certain mandatoryminimum penalties.” 81 With the ability to formally interact with Congress, the
Commission is in a unique position compared to federal judges. Although the
Commission is an extension of the judiciary, the same separation of powers that
traditionally divides the two branches seems to be milder.
B. Federal Prosecutors
In district courts, one of the roles of the U.S. Attorneys is to prosecute criminal
cases brought by the federal government.82 U.S. Attorneys have all the resources of
the government and traditionally have federal agents to assist them in the
76. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).
77. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). “A substantively reasonable sentence is
one that is ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to accomplish [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)’s sentencing
goals.” United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 977 n.16 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
78. See United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (“When a sentencing ‘judge
decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the deviation
and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.’”
(quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (2008)).
79. United States v. Plaza, 471 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2006); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
50 (2007).
80. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note
7, at 2–3.
81. Id.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 547.
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prosecution of federal defendants.83 In addition to the availability of these crucial
resources, the number of U.S. Attorneys has grown substantially. At the turn of the
century, “the number of attorney and non-attorney positions more than tripled,
from around 3,000 to over 10,000. And they continue to grow, though at a
lesser pace.”84
The Guidelines, and especially the mandatory minimums, have removed
power from judges and brought immense power to federal prosecutors. As
discussed above, the charge brought against a defendant indicates the total offense
level or triggers the mandatory minimum, which in effect dictates the sentence a
defendant will receive. Through the Guidelines’ Sentencing Table, “[t]he sentencing
process now involves the rote consideration of a matrix of impersonal data
dominated by often irrelevant drug quantities and other circumstances that can be
shaped by the prosecutor’s charging choices.”85 There is no judicial review of the
charging decisions made by prosecutors. Mark Osler, who worked as a federal
prosecutor in Detroit, said, “I had all the power. It was about whether I filed a
notice of enhancement or gave points for acceptance of responsibility. It’s not
reviewable. It’s within the discretion of the prosecutor.”86 So, if a statute carries a
lengthy minimum sentence, a judge does not have a remedy to lighten the sentence
or revise the charge a defendant is facing. Rather, prosecutors, in effect, sentence
convicted defendants by the charges they bring, and prosecutors typically charge
drug defendants with offenses carrying mandatory-minimum sentences. 87 Osler
notes a primary difference between federal judges and federal prosecutors: judges’
work is done with transparency at the forefront, while prosecutors’ decisions are
made in darkness. 88 Although the Presentence Investigation Report, which
calculates the Guidelines for a judge, is completed by Federal Probation and
Pre-Trial Services, the recommendations by federal prosecutors carry significant
weight.89 Furthermore, judges often accept the Presentence Investigation Report as
is and make sentencing choices based on its contents.90

83. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 3-1.20 (2018).
84. Nora V. Demleitner, Revisiting the Role of Federal Prosecutors in Times of Mass Imprisonment,
30 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 166 (2018).
85. See, e.g., Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33.
86. Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-for-judgment/46
3380/ [ https://perma.cc/QA2M-GVQ5 ].
87. HUM. RTS. WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW US FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 3 (2013).
88. Van Meter, supra note 86.
89. See Sentencing Project: Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1989–1990: IV, 79 GEO. L.J. 1089, 1094 (1991) (“The presentence
investigation report (PSI) plays a critical role in the judge’s determination of the applicable sentencing
guideline range and in the imposition of an appropriate sentence.”).
90. See Jennifer Niles Coffin, Tap Dancing Through the Minefield: Navigating the Presentence
Process, 31 CHAMPION 10, 10 (2007) (“[T]he presentence report . . . functions as the most powerful
inertial force in the sentencing process.”).
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Prosecutors effectively use the Guidelines and mandatory minimums through
plea bargains. Because prosecutors have charging discretion, “[p]rosecutors
frequently threaten to bring charges carrying long mandatory-minimum sentences
and longer guidelines sentences.” 91 Prosecutors claim they are not “punishing”
defendants with lengthier sentences when they refuse a plea bargain, but rather are
“rewarding” defendants who, by pleading guilty, spare the criminal justice system
the expenditure of time and resources needed for a trial. 92 However, from the
perspective of the defendant who is looking at the significance of the penalty faced
at trial, there is no difference.93 These threats can easily persuade a defendant to
plead guilty.
Often, prosecutors making charging decisions are fully expecting the
defendant to plead guilty. To secure the guilty plea,
prosecutors may then offer to lessen the charges, they may offer to reduce
the ones that do not carry mandatory sentences, to stipulate to sentencing
factors that lower the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines or,
at the very least, to support a reduced sentence based on the defendant’s
willingness to accept responsibility for the offense, i.e., to plead guilty.94
Prosecutors can also ask for Booker waivers.95 A Booker waiver occurs when
prosecutors press defendants to contract into a plea agreement that stipulates that
the Guidelines are mandatory or that stipulates to a particular Guidelines sentence.96
Booker waivers restrict a defendant’s right to petition the judge for a more lenient
sentence. 97 But, charging practices and plea negotiations vary widely within the
country’s ninety-four judicial districts. Thirty-two percent of district court judges
expressed that charging decisions by federal prosecutors were the number one
reason for sentencing disparities across the federal criminal justice system.98
While there may be some benefits to entering into a guilty plea, it is not
without its negative consequences. Plea bargains erase the possibility of appeal on
the merits and remove all grounds for legal defenses.99 Furthermore, defendants
often are incentivized to testify against others in exchange for leniency.100 As a result
of these tools available to prosecutors, every year at least ninety-five percent of
federal drug defendants plead guilty.101 Plea bargaining can yield higher sentences
91. Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33.
92. See Bennett L. Gershman, Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327,
328–29, 343–44 (2014); HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87.
93. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 7.
94. Id. at 4.
95. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246–47 (2005).
96. Id.
97. Klein, supra note 70, at 735.
98. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY, supra note 71, at pt. V, tbl.16.
99. See Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right
to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 875–78 (2010).
100. See Christopher T. Robertson & D. Alex Winkelman, Incentives, Lies, and Disclosure, 20
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 33, 34–35, 39–40 (2017).
101. See Mandatory Minimums and Sentencing Reform, supra note 33.
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for defendants who opt to go to trial.102 For example, federal prosecutors offered
to let Patricio Paladin plead in return for a twenty-year sentence for cocaine
distribution.103 He is now serving a life sentence without the opportunity for parole
because he refused to plead.104 In recent years, the average sentence for federal drug
offenders convicted after trial was three times higher than that received after a guilty
plea. 105 The possibility of a longer sentence places enormous pressure on
defendants to plead guilty, whether or not they are actually innocent or have a strong
legal defense.
In addition to plea bargains, prosecutors also hold the power to ask a judge to
grant departures. The Guidelines section 5K1.1 authorizes a departure from the
Guidelines range if the offender provided substantial assistance to law enforcement
and the government files a motion to that effect.106 However, Guidelines section
5K1.1 does not authorize courts to impose a sentence below a mandatory-minimum
penalty.107 For mandatory-minimum cases, prosecutors may file a motion pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) with the court to permit a judge to sentence below the
mandatory-minimum sentences if a defendant has substantially aided the
government’s efforts to prosecute others. 108 However, judicial discretion is still
limited because “[s]uch sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines
and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”109 A prosecutor has
full discretion on whether to file this motion with the court.
On the other hand, prosecutors may file motions to increase the penalties
should a defendant not plead guilty. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), prior felony drug
convictions can dramatically increase a mandatory-minimum drug sentence.110 If a
prosecutor files a motion informing the court of two prior convictions for a
defendant facing a one-year mandatory-minimum sentence on the current drug
offense, the minimum sentence increases.111 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), prosecutors
can file charges that radically increase a defendant’s punishment if a firearm was
involved in the drug offense.112 The first conviction imposes a mandatory five-year
sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed for the underlying drug crime, while
102. See also, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 1–2 (“Weldon Angelos was offered a plea
of 15 years for marijuana distribution and gun possession. He refused the plea and is now serving a
55-year sentence.”).
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2.
106. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
107. Id.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
109. Id. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 5C1.2 also allows for a safety valve for
defendants who are sentenced under a mandatory-minimum offense but meet a certain criterion under
the statute. However, few drug-offense defendants meet this criterion, and judges are directed to impose
a sentence that falls within the advisory Guidelines range. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
110. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 5.
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second and subsequent convictions each carry twenty-five-year consecutive
sentences, resulting in disturbingly long sentences.113
III. A NEED FOR REFORM
A. Prosecutors on Top
Formally, the Commission and the mandatory minimums sit “atop [the]
pyramid of violence.”114 These Guidelines ranges and mandatory minimums place
official quantitative limits on judicial discretion. Through the lens of uniformity and
predictability, the Guidelines give the perception to a judge that there is a right
answer when it comes to sentencing a defendant. However, by limiting judicial
discretion, the Guidelines and mandatory minimums open the door to an unfair and
unjust criminal “justice” system, where special circumstances and actual defendant
culpability become unimportant and not part of the immediate sentencing
calculus. 115 There are many cases where first-time drug offenders—who played
minimal roles in a larger criminal organization—are sentenced simply on the type
and the quantity of drugs, leaving the judge with no remedy. The adjustments that
attempt to “reward” a minimal participant do not drastically shift the offense level
down.116 Furthermore, grounds for judicial departure from the advisory sentence
are somewhat limited. The Guidelines list specific reasons and policies that should
warrant departure. 117 Normalizing departure from the Guidelines, or making it
easier to justify departure from Chapter Three of the Guidelines, would restore
some of the judicial discretion judges once enjoyed.
A policy of distrust of the judiciary and judicial discretion has led to the
creation of such an unfair and unjust system. The federal criminal justice system
entrusts judges with wide discretion at trial, which determines innocence or guilt,
yet rejects judicial discretion when it comes to the imposition of a sentence.118
Operating in tandem, the Guidelines and mandatory minimums have made it very
“difficult—and often impossible—for a judge to impose a relatively light rather
than a heavy sentence, to find an alternative to incarceration where [it] seems
unproductive, [and] to avoid sentences that impose unreasonable social costs.”119
As Professor Cover notes, “The act of sentencing a convicted defendant is among
these most routine of acts performed by judges.” 120 Yet, judges have had their
discretion in sentencing stripped away.
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)–(C).
114. Cover, supra note 1.
115. See William W. Schwarzer, Commentary, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G
REP. 339, 340 (1991).
116. See supra Section I.B.
117. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. K (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
118. Schwarzer, supra note 115, at 341. For example, judges rule on evidentiary objections that
determine what the factfinder can consider when making its guilt determination.
119. Id.
120. Cover, supra note 1, at 1607.
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Informally, and more importantly, practically, prosecutors now sit “atop [the]
pyramid of violence.”121 Discretion shifted from judges to prosecutors. With the
ability to drive sentences using plea bargains and be the gatekeepers of departures
from mandatory minimums and the Guidelines, federal prosecutors now are in the
driver’s seat. Charging decisions and plea bargains allow a prosecutor to dictate the
potential sentence within a small range. These prosecutorial decisions are largely
unreviewable on appeal, and “even when courts agree that prosecutors have sought
egregiously long mandatory sentences for drug offenses, they will not rule the
sentences so disproportionate as to be unconstitutionally cruel.” 122 Because the
mandatory minimums and Guidelines curtail judicial discretion, prosecutors have
assumed much of the role of sentencing; prosecutors effectively sentence convicted
defendants based on charges they decide to bring.
B. What Do We Do Now?
Now, the question is whether discretion should be restored to judges, and if
so, how should it be restored in light of the Guidelines and mandatory minimums.
The first step towards restoring the discretion that judges once enjoyed is to remove
the statutorily imposed mandatory minimums, which can only be removed by
Congress. Forcing judges to hand down unreasonably lengthy sentences fails to
produce fair and just results. Many judges find that mandatory-minimum laws
prevent them from practicing the principle that a convicted criminal offender
should receive a punishment proportional to his or her crime and culpability.123
A one-size-fits-all solution is not the panacea to creating a more just
sentencing system, especially when the United States leads the world in
incarceration rates.124 According to the Equal Justice Initiative, the “United States
Department of Justice shows the United States still incarcerates its citizens at a rate
5 to 10 times higher than other industrialized countries.” 125 With the advisory
Guidelines and proper appellate review to keep discretion in sentencing within
reason, there is no place in our system for mandatory-minimum sentences that
primarily serve a prosecutor’s mission to strong-arm defendants into entering a
guilty plea. 126 The Guidelines, if properly used as an advisory starting point by

121. Id. at 1609.
122. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87.
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in [the statute].”).
124. Sintia Radu, Countries with the Highest Incarceration Rates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May
13, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-05-13/10countries-with-the-highest-incarceration-rates
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20190514060918/
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-05-13/10-countries-with-the-highestincarceration-rates ].
125. United States Still Has Highest Incarceration Rate in the World, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://eji.org/news/united-states-still-has-highest-incarceration-rate-world/
[ https://perma.cc/PS2X-ZGHT ].
126. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87.
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judges, reduce the sentencing disparities that sparked their existence in the first
place. But normalizing departures from the Guidelines is necessary in order for the
Guidelines to actually be just a starting point.
Additionally, the criminal justice system can focus efforts on making plea
bargains more effective, if not on reducing the dominant role of plea bargains. One
proposal is to have “executive prosecutors” in each office only dedicated to
conducting the plea-bargaining process with defense counsel. 127 Executive
prosecutors would “have full responsibility for evaluating the facts of all cases
assigned to them, deciding what sentence recommendations should be made upon
conviction following trial, and determining to what extent a recommendation
should be reduced upon the entry of a guilty plea.”128 The recommendations from
executive prosecutors should be based solely on the crime committed, the
defendant’s criminal background, and the strength of the state’s case. 129 The
executive prosecutor, devoted solely to plea bargaining, would develop great skills
in discerning the best outcome in the most difficult cases.130 Furthermore, when
plea bargaining is placed in the hands of a few people, uniformity and consistency
in results for defendants will be increased.131 However, getting the “right” person
in this position could pose a great challenge. Because the executive prosecutor will
not be the lead attorney on the case, reliance on subjective evaluations of the
defendant and “conflict[s] between office policies and . . . personal goals will
be minimized.”132
In order to effectuate this solution, prosecutors must also be pressed to
exercise their charging discretion with fairness in mind. A maximum sentence
mentality does not promote any of the aims of clarity, honesty, and uniformity,
which were primary considerations in the shaping of the Guidelines. Although
charging discretion is a necessary part of the role of a prosecutor, “the final say over
sentences defendants receive must come from independent federal judges who have
no personal or institutional stake in the outcome of a case other than to ensure
justice is done and rights are respected.”133 Mandatory sentencing strips all of this
discretion. Arguably, the Guidelines make it harder for judges to exercise this
discretion because their initial sentencing inquiry must be calculated a certain way.
Judges who have been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate are
in a better position than elected and hired prosecutors to determine the ultimate
fate of defendants.134
127. See Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119
U. PA. L. REV. 439, 453–54 (1971).
128. Id. at 454.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 455.
132. Id. at 454–55.
133. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 87, at 12.
134. Although judges are not directly accountable to the public, the President and Legislative
Branch are directly accountable through elections.
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CONCLUSION
In 1986 and 1987, judicial discretion was formally limited for the first time by
the introduction of mandatory minimums and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Mandatory minimums have forced judges to issue excessively long sentences,
including life sentences, for those defendants convicted of drug offenses. The
mandatory minimums do not allow for individual evaluation of each defendant and
remove the humanizing component of sentencing so integral to the role of the
judge. The Guidelines, released by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, provide
advisory sentencing ranges for all offenses. For drug offenses, the primary driver of
the sentence is the quantity of the substance, while possessing firearms, playing a
leadership role, or having a criminal history can also increase the sentencing range.
Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory after the Supreme Court’s ruling
in United States v. Booker, judges are still required to start their analysis by calculating
the appropriate Guideline range and may make departures only when there are
compelling reasons.135
With the implementation of the mandatory minimums and Guidelines,
Professor Cover’s assertion that judges sit “atop [the] pyramid of violence” has been
greatly altered.136 Although the mandatory minimums and Guidelines formally limit
judicial discretion, informally, federal prosecutors have risen to the top of this
pyramid. With the ability to threaten draconian sentences for defendants who do
not plead guilty, prosecutors are almost always able to secure plea bargains and
punish those who do not accept responsibility for their alleged crimes. 137 In
practice, prosecutors now sit “atop [of this] pyramid of violence” because, with the
implementation of the mandatory minimums and the Guidelines, when they charge
a defendant, they are also sentencing the defendant. 138 Prosecutors are thinking
about the sentence when they decide which charges to file at the outset of the case.
To restore the role of sentencing to the judge, mandatory minimums must
disappear from our federal criminal justice system. Judges must be allowed to
exercise their discretion and have the final say in how convicted drug offenders
should be sentenced. Because federal judges are appointed by the President,
confirmed by the Senate, and represent a neutral party as the judiciary, they are in a
better position than prosecutors to be making the sentencing decisions for federal
offenders. This can be accomplished through making departure from the Guidelines
more mainstream. Another reform, the idea of the executive prosecutor, would
reduce plea bargains’ ability to unfairly drive sentences. Although reforms are in
progress, we will not see judges return to their position “atop [of the] pyramid of
violence” until formal, quantitative limits do not impede judicial discretion.139

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265–68 (2005).
Cover, supra note 1.
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Cover, supra note 1.
Id.
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